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INTRODUCTION 
My sabbatical project focuses on the philosophy of mathematics.  This is a fascinating 
aspect of mathematics that is often overlooked in graduate mathematics coursework.  Every 
mathematician has a view of the nature of mathematics, even if he or she does not articulate it.  
This philosophy informs our views on what constitutes mathematical truth, what counts as 
mathematical knowledge, what mathematical work looks like, and how the general body of 
mathematical content is created.  Non-mathematicians are often surprised to find out that 
mathematics, like other disciplines, can be approached from more than one philosophical 
framework.  People often think of math as a concrete discipline, with definite right and wrong 
answers.  However, some mathematicians and philosophers do not see it this way.  Some see 
math as the only concrete discipline that can be counted on for absolute truth.  Others see it as 
subject to human error, like theories in the sciences.   
My goals for this sabbatical were to learn more about the different philosophies of 
mathematics, and to create a summary and resource list for my colleagues.  I began in July 2008, 
attending the International Congress on Mathematical Education in Monterrey, Mexico.  This 
conference brought together mathematicians and mathematics educators from all over the world.  
There were many philosophy-related sessions, including a set of discussion groups on the 
philosophy of mathematics and its role in mathematics education.  I was often the only person 
from the United States in the room, and it was very interesting to hear how these issues are much 
more common in educational discussions in other countries.  Upon my return, I read numerous 
primary and secondary sources.  I began with secondary works about the philosophy of 
mathematics, to get a general feel for the field of study.  Then I read primary material by several 
major mathematical philosophers.  I also met with Dr. Timothy McCarthy, a philosophy of 
2 
 
mathematics professor at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.  In November, I 
attended the Midwest Philosophy of Mathematics Workshop at the University of Notre Dame.  
There I met many philosophers of mathematics and watched presentations on major 
contemporary questions in the field.  Finally, I compiled this report to summarize some of the 
major philosophical opinions and to offer a list of resources.  I have included an annotated 
bibliography to guide those who might be interested in further reading on the subject.  I also 
presented a summary of my project to my colleagues at a meeting for faculty in the Mathematics 
Department. 
Learning about different philosophies of mathematics has allowed me to explore my own 
views on mathematics and its teaching.  It has been fascinating to look at mathematics in 
different ways, and to think about how I might present these different perspectives in my 
classroom.  Each philosophy provides an alternate view of the mathematical world, and I think 
each represents an important aspect of the discipline.  If I can share different ways of looking at 
mathematics with my students, I can show them that it is not all about memorizing rules and 
solving equations.  This may capture their interest and allow them to see math as a bigger 
picture—as something worth exploring, thinking about, and discussing.   
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WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS? 
The philosophy of mathematics considers what is behind the math that we do.  What is 
mathematics?  Is it some cosmic truth we discover, or is it created by humans?  Do mathematical 
objects such as numbers and functions really exist, or are they just symbols we have invented?  
Two of the great debates in the history of mathematical philosophy center around ontology and 
epistemology.  Where did mathematics come from?  How do we know that it is true?     
 Where did mathematics come from?  Is it discovered or created?  Ontological questions 
are concerned with the nature and status of mathematical objects.  Some people believe that the 
numbers, functions, and other mathematical objects that we talk about actually exist, either in the 
world or “out there” somewhere.  There are things about them that we need to learn.  Statements 
like 2 + 2 = 4 are true whether we know about them or not, and they are waiting to be 
discovered.  This is called independent truth.  It can be likened to the perennial question, “If a 
tree falls in the forest with no one around, does it make a sound?”  Here, “If there are no humans 
to study mathematics, does mathematical truth still exist?”  Those who believe in independent 
truth say yes.  Others believe that mathematical symbols have been made up to make our 
calculations possible, and that mathematical truth is a human invention.  These debates can get 
very heated, sometimes taking on an almost religious tone.  To some, denying the existence of 
independent truth is dangerously close to denying the role of God as creator of all.   
 How do we know that mathematics is true?  How do we know that what we think is true 
really is?  Epistemological questions address issues of mathematical justification and knowledge.  
In the mathematical community, the primary means of justification is proof.  A proof begins with 
a set of axioms, and generates a sequence of statements, through inference, that ends in the given 
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proposition.1  The debate that arises surrounds the nature of the knowledge that results.  The 
traditional philosophy of mathematics has been one which asserts that mathematics offers 
absolute certainty through proof.2  This certainty is called absolute truth.  But how can we be 
sure that what we have come to know is true?  Some philosophers say we are sure because we 
proved it using deduction and reasoning.  Others say we are sure because of the way 
mathematics models scientific phenomena.  There is also a group of philosophers who believe 
that we can’t be sure that what we know is actually true, but that it doesn’t matter. 
 In this report, I will summarize several positions in the philosophy of mathematics, both 
historical and contemporary.  The diversity of opinions provides an intriguing look at the world 
of mathematics.  These philosophers offer a sense that there is more going on behind “ 5 8+ =x ” 
than meets the eye. 
    
                                                            
1 Paul Ernest, Social Constructivism as a Philosophy of Mathematics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1998), 6. 
2 Kurt Stemhagen, “Beyond Absolutism and Constructivism: The Case for an Evolutionary Philosophy of 
Mathematics Education” (PhD diss., University of Virginia, 2004), 25. 
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HISTORICAL FIGURES IN MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY 
 The traditional philosophy of mathematics has been one which asserts that mathematics 
offers absolute certainty or truth.3  This view can be traced all the way back to Plato, and still 
persists today.  However, there have been differing opinions about what, exactly, mathematics is 
and how we access it.  Here I will discuss three influential philosophers in the history of 
mathematics. 
Plato 
 Plato believed in a metaphysical view of mathematics in which the mathematician must 
open his mind to grasp the independent, eternal truth that is waiting to be revealed.  
Mathematical objects are not created in the mind of the mathematician for their utility, but exist 
eternally in an intangible world which Plato calls the world of Being.  The number 2, the perfect 
sphere, and so on, all exist in the world of Being.  When we use these concepts, we use imperfect 
representations to refer to the real object.  For example, numbers themselves are part of the 
world of Being, but we use physical numbers to count objects.  Mathematicians deal with 
numbers themselves, “those numbers that can be grasped only in thought and can’t be dealt with 
in any other way.”4  Similarly, geometry is not about anything in the physical world.  Students of 
geometry use figures of different shapes, but they are imperfect reflections of the real shapes.5  
Mathematical statements, then, refer to real objects and are either true or false—it is up to the 
mathematician to discover which.   
                                                            
3 Ibid. 
4 Plato, Republic, trans. G. M. A. Grube, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing, 1997), 526a. 
5 Ibid., 510d. 
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Aristotle 
 Aristotle, on the other hand, believed that the mathematical realm is the physical realm.  
Aristotle believed in independent, absolute truth, but he believed that mathematical objects exist 
in the empirical world, in physical objects.6  Generalizations in geometry can be made by 
considering only those properties of an object that all such objects have in common.7  For 
example, a student draws a circle on a piece of paper.  She ignores the irrelevant properties such 
as the color of the paper and ink, the thickness of the line, and the fact that her “circle” tilts to 
one side.  Instead, she considers what would be true if it were a perfect circle:  that it would 
measure 360 degrees around, that its radius would be half its diameter, etc.  Then she can use it 
as an illustration to study the properties of circles in general.  Like Plato, Aristotle sees 
mathematical truth as independent of the knower, waiting to be discovered.  But unlike Plato, he 
finds this truth through the study of perceptible objects. 
The influence of Plato and Aristotle has continued throughout history.  In the seventeenth 
century, two major schools of philosophy were prominent.  The rationalists, heirs of Plato, found 
knowledge through reason.  The empiricists, influenced by Aristotle, found knowledge through 
experience.  Both schools agreed that mathematical objects exist in the physical world, and that 
mathematical truth exists independently of the knower.  They differed, however, as to how they 
thought knowledge about mathematical objects was accessed.8  Rationalists believed that 
mathematics takes place in the rational mind.  Empiricists studied only the perceived objects 
themselves, believing knowledge is gained through sensory experience.9   
                                                            
6 Stewart Shapiro, Thinking About Mathematics: The Philosophy of Mathematics (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 64. 
7 Ibid., 68. 
8 Ibid., 75. 
9 Ibid. 
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Kant 
 In the eighteenth century, new developments in mathematics such as physics, algebraic 
geometry, and calculus presented new challenges for mathematical philosophy.10  Physical 
applicability and notions of the infinite challenged philosophies of abstract mathematics.  
Immanuel Kant attempted to synthesize rationalism and empiricism in response to the challenges 
posed by new mathematical advances.  For Kant, intuition is the link between the rational and the 
empirical.  Rational analysis does not provide us with information about the existence of the 
concepts in question.11  It will allow me to say that if a triangle has two congruent sides, it will 
also have two congruent angles.  But it will not tell me if any such triangles actually exist.  
Intuition provides information about how we perceive space and time.12  It gives the rational 
mind information about which triangles can actually exist, so that reason can determine which 
judgments about them are true.  Intuition provides information about what could be experienced, 
allowing us to construct new concepts without sensory experience.  For Kant, “mathematical 
knowledge is the knowledge gained by reason from the construction of concepts.”13  
Mathematical knowledge is gained through the construction of particular examples, combined 
with the use of reason to abstract and prove universal truths from those constructions.  Kant’s 
view has provided the seeds for modern constructivist theories of mathematical learning, which 
hold that students must mentally construct mathematical concepts for themselves rather than 
passively absorbing explanations from the teacher.  
 The work of Plato, Aristotle, and Kant still influences mathematical philosophy today.  
Twentieth and twenty-first century philosophies tend to reflect the assumption that mathematics 
                                                            
10 Ibid., 73. 
11 Ibid., 79. 
12 Ibid., 81. 
13 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (Boston: Macmillan, 1965), B741.  Italics 
in the original. 
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is certain, a source of absolute truth.  However, there are also philosophers who are turning away 
from this, holding instead that mathematics is created by humans and is therefore fallible.  Next, 
I will discuss the major positions in contemporary mathematical philosophy. 
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MODERN ABSOLUTIST PHILOSOPHIES 
 In the twentieth century and today, there are three philosophies of mathematics that tend 
to dominate discussion:  logicism, formalism, and intuitionism.  All are traditional in the sense 
that they find absolute truth in mathematics.  However, they offer differing views on the origins 
of mathematical content. 
Logicism 
Logicism is the view that all mathematical concepts can be defined and all theorems can 
be derived using the concepts and axioms of logic, through definition and deduction.14  Important 
logicists have included Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell.  While differing on many points, 
they agreed that arithmetic can be expressed using logic.  For example, the number two is 
defined as  
2(P) ≡ (∃x)(∃y) [P(x) ⋅ P(y) ⋅ x ≠ y ⋅ (z)(P(z) ⊃. z = x ∨ z = y)]   
(read: ‘there are two Ps if and only if there are x, y such that x is P and y is P and x is not 
the same thing as y and for all z, if z is P then z is the same as x or z is the same as y’.)15 
Logical positivism is a form of logicism which incorporates empiricism.  The logical positivists, 
such as Rudolf Carnap and A. J. Ayer, view mathematics as a language.  Mathematical truth is 
found through knowledge of the rules of mathematical language.  Thus truth is objective and 
absolute within these rules, but has no factual content about the world.16  Factual knowledge 
must be gained through experience.  While logicism’s cumbersome and restrictive nature has 
caused it to fall out of favor as a comprehensive philosophy of mathematics, its influence is still 
seen in the field of mathematical logic. 
                                                            
14 Rudolf Carnap, "The Logicist Foundations of Mathematics," in Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings, 
ed. Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 41. 
15 Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam, "Introduction," in Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings, ed. Paul 
Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 15. 
16 Shapiro, 129-31. 
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Formalism 
Formalism, associated with the work of David Hilbert, is the philosophy that mathematics 
is nothing but the manipulation of meaningless symbols within a finite axiomatic system.  
Mathematical truth is determined by the rules of the system in which one is working—to 
generate truth, such systems must be consistent and complete.  Consistency insures that it is not 
possible to derive logically contradictory statements from the given axioms, and completeness 
guarantees that all logical truths can be proved within the system.17  Formalists believe that 
mathematics is a purely academic enterprise, like deriving an internally consistent system of 
physics based on the assumption that the world is flat—intellectually stimulating, but not 
referring to anything in the real world.  Mathematics is done purely for the sake of mathematics.    
Intuitionism 
  Intuitionism is a form of constructivism, which holds that “mathematics is a production 
of the human mind.”18  Intuitionism strives to avoid any metaphysical basis for mathematics.  
There is no independent reality that contains mathematical objects and truths.  Without humans, 
mathematics would not exist—it is constructed by us, not discovered by us.  We mentally 
construct the system of mathematics, and make logical inferences to construct mathematical 
statements.  Despite the view that there is no independent mathematical truth, intuitionists still 
believe there is absolute truth if mathematics is constructed properly.  They are more restrictive 
in their methods of proof, holding that one cannot prove that the existence of something is 
mathematically possible without describing how to construct it.  For example, I cannot prove that 
a particular kind of number exists just by showing that it has to exist because something else is 
true.  I must actually provide an example, or describe how an example could be created.  A major 
                                                            
17 Richard Wiebe, "Gödel's Theorem (Part II)," The Two-Year College Mathematics Journal 6, no. 3 (1975): 4. 
18 Arend Heyting, "The Intuitionist Foundation of Mathematics," in Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings, 
ed. Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 52. 
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tenet of this philosophy is that the law of the excluded middle cannot be assumed, and therefore 
neither can the resulting principle of double negation.  L. E. J. Brouwer explains that one cannot 
assume that a statement and its negation are mutually exclusive just on general principle, without 
knowing to which objects the statement refers.19  Intuitionists endeavor to rebuild mathematics, 
using what they see as “safe” methods of proof. 
 While these positions outline the major traditional views in the philosophy of 
mathematics, there are also a growing number of philosophers who stray from the idea that 
mathematical truth is absolute.  Instead, they believe that mathematics is fallible.  These 
philosophers have differing views on whether independent truth exists, but they share the view 
that our mathematical knowledge is never certain.  
                                                            
19 Shapiro, 179. 
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MODERN FALLIBILIST PHILOSOPHIES 
 While the traditional view is that mathematical truth is absolute, some mathematical 
philosophers disagree.  Some of these philosophers believe that independent mathematical truth 
exists, but we can never be sure if we have accessed it correctly.  Others see mathematics as a set 
of human conventions which do not refer to an independent set of truths.  In both cases, 
mathematics is seen as fallible rather than certain.   
 The term “fallibilism” was first applied to the philosophy of mathematics by Imre 
Lakatos.20  Borrowing heavily from Karl Popper’s account of empirical science, Lakatos 
developed a philosophy of mathematics called quasi-empiricism.  This view holds that any 
mathematical system depends on a set of assumptions that cannot be proved.21  Mathematical 
knowledge results from a process of conjecture, proof, and refutation.  As in science, 
mathematical theories are posed, tested, and refined, and are subject to falsification later, in light 
of new information.22  Lakatos calls his philosophy quasi-empirical because counterexamples are 
generated abstractly, not observed in the spatio-temporal world.23  The work of Lakatos has 
contributed much to the development of fallibilist philosophies of mathematics. 
 Most of the predominant fallibilist philosophies of mathematics can be categorized as 
some form of constructivism.24  These views can be traced back to the work of Kant, a lineage 
they share with intuitionism.  What separates fallibilist constructivism from intuitionism, 
however, is the view that mathematical judgments are not guaranteed any certainty through 
logical inference.  Different areas of constructivism account differently for the origin of 
                                                            
20 Ernest, Social Constructivism, 10. 
21 Ibid., 25. 
22 Marilyn Nickson, "The Culture of the Mathematics Classroom: An Unknown Quantity?" in Cultural Perspectives 
on the Mathematics Classroom, ed. Stephen Lerman (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
1994), 11. 
23 Reuben Hersh, What is Mathematics, Really? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 213. 
24 Stemhagen, 47.     
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mathematical concepts.  Two major categories are represented by Ernst von Glasersfeld’s radical 
constructivism and Paul Ernest’s social constructivism. 
Radical Constructivism  
 Von Glasersfeld’s radical constructivism is based on the Kantian idea that the status of a 
knowledge claim cannot be determined by comparing it to some external reality.  There is no 
way to make this objective comparison, because we do not have access to any such reality 
outside of our experience.25  There might be an external reality, and there might not.  We have no 
way of knowing.  Instead, reality and truth are constructed in the individual mind.  Von 
Glasersfeld’s account of this construction comes from a psychological standpoint, incorporating 
his own version of Piaget’s theory of cognitive development.  To von Glasersfeld, reality is 
constructed gradually through our experiences.  Knowledge organizes our experiential world—it 
does not discover an external reality.26  Therefore, knowledge cannot be transmitted from one 
person to another:  it is actively constructed in the human mind, either individually or in response 
to interaction and discussion with others.27   
Mathematical knowledge, then, is also a human construction for von Glasersfeld.  It is 
not some external, independent truth.  Rather it is a system of concepts and symbols that have 
been given meaning through human construction.  It is not possible to construct just any 
mathematical ideas you want, though, because they are subject to corroboration from others in 
the mathematical community.  For example, 2 + 2 = 4 is a fact that is certain because we have 
                                                            
25 Ernst von Glasersfeld, Radical Constructivism: A Way of Knowing and Learning (London: Falmer Press, 1995), 4. 
26 Ernst von Glasersfeld, "An Exposition of Constructivism: Why Some Like it Radical," in Constructivist Views on 
the Teaching and Learning of Mathematics, ed. Robert B. Davis, Carolyn A. Maher, and Nel Noddings, Journal for 
Research in Mathematics Education Monograph 4 (Reston, VA: National Council of Teachers of Mathematics, 
1990), 22-23. 
27 D. C. Phillips, "An Opinionated Account of the Constructivist Landscape," in Constructivism in Education: 
Opinions and Second Opinions on Controversial Issues, ed. D. C. Phillips, pt. 1 of Ninety-Ninth Yearbook of the 
National Society for the Study of Education (Chicago: National Society for the Study of Education, 2000), 7.   
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come to construct units in a certain way and have agreed on how they are to be counted.28  We 
can be sure of facts that logically follow from this construction.  For someone’s own construction 
to be considered correct, it would have to be compatible and produce these facts.  Therefore, 
even though mathematics is a human construction, it is still objective and true.  However, this is 
not an absolute, certain truth because it could later be found faulty. 
Social Constructivism  
 Ernest’s social constructivism is based on the same premise as radical constructivism—
that knowledge is constructed, not discovered.  Social constructivists, however, believe that all 
knowledge is determined by social convention.29  What counts as knowledge is decided by 
human interaction and social reality.  Ernest argues that mathematics is fallible because its 
foundation is a set of assumptions that cannot be proved, and because its system of deduction is 
uncertain.  Mathematics is built on a set of assumptions, and is deduced from those assumptions 
using rules of inference that we must assume are sound.30  Because we are working under 
agreed-upon assumptions, mathematics is actually determined by social agreement.  Thus, 
whereas von Glasersfeld focuses on the individual construction of personal knowledge, Ernest 
focuses on the social construction of shared knowledge.   
Ernest sees the traditional, absolutist view of mathematics as a futile search for an 
objective, independent truth that we can never know for sure.  Ernest does believe in an external 
reality, but not in an absolute knowledge of it.  Mathematical knowledge is a human creation, 
and is therefore fallible.  In Ernest’s social constructivism, the human element is based in 
mathematical language, which has developed over time as the mathematical community has 
                                                            
28 Ernst von Glasersfeld, "Aspects of Radical Constructivism and Its Educational Recommendations," in Theories of 
Mathematical Learning, ed. Leslie P. Steffe and Pearla Nesher (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1996), 
313. 
29 Phillips, 6. 
30 von Glasersfeld, "Exposition of Constructivism," 28. 
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come to agree on the meanings of terms, symbols, syntax, and proof, along with rules for their 
use.31  Ernest also draws from his interpretation of Lakatos’ work to explain how mathematical 
knowledge is generated.  This is a cycle called the Logic of Mathematical Discovery (LMD), in 
which a conjecture is proved, tested, and is subject to revision if counterexamples emerge.32  
This cycle repeats until the person is satisfied with her proof.  Then she presents it to the 
mathematical community for public critique and the cycle begins again.  In this way, 
mathematics is created as a body of knowledge which has come to be accepted by the 
mathematical community as rigorously proven.33     
 An important aspect of Ernest’s philosophy is the social responsibility of mathematics.  
He argues that all knowledge is generated by human intellectual activity, and as part of this 
knowledge, mathematics is culture-bound and value-laden.34  Mathematics is not a collection of 
absolute truths, but rather a system that has been created through social exchange.  Because it is 
defined by the mathematical community, cultural values and preferences are involved in its 
formation.35  This incorporates a social responsibility, with ethical consequences.  One aspect of 
this is the responsibility for the consequences of mathematical developments and applications.  
Another aspect is a responsibility for the conventions and values in the discipline.  There are 
equity issues involved in the determination of what counts as valuable mathematics, what counts 
as rigorous proof, and who counts as a member of the mathematics community. 
 These fallibilist philosophies of mathematics are interesting, because instead of focusing 
on math as absolute truth, they reflect the way mathematics as a discipline has evolved over time.  
Regardless of whether some cosmic mathematical truth exists, it is mathematicians who have put 
                                                            
31 Ernest, Social Constructivism, 79. 
32 Ibid., 112. 
33 Ibid., 144. 
34 Paul Ernest, The Philosophy of Mathematics Education (London: Falmer Press, 1991), 262-63. 
35 Ernest, Social Constructivism, 270. 
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forth conjectures and, as a community, have determined which of those conjectures have been 
proved satisfactorily and will be deemed part of the body of accepted mathematics.  As humans, 
they can make mistakes.  Sometimes a crucial error is discovered many years later, and a proof is 
ultimately rejected or revised.36  Fallibilist philosophies may sound strange at first, but they seem 
less so if we just think about the body of mathematics that humans know about, and how it has 
been put together. 
  
                                                            
36 Ibid., 29. 
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CONCLUSION 
 This project has provided me with many new ways of thinking about mathematics.  This 
is fascinating to me not only as a mathematician, but also as a mathematics teacher.  While there 
are many elements that impact the way someone teaches mathematics, one of these is 
philosophy.  Teachers have a philosophy of mathematics, even if they have not explicitly thought 
about it.  The way they think about math influences the way they present it to their students.  For 
example, a Platonist may value traditional lecture and an emphasis on mathematical reasoning, 
while an Aristotelian may prefer examples and hands-on demonstrations.  A formalist might tend 
to focus on mathematical rules and procedures.  A fallibilist might believe that students need to 
experience the creation of mathematical concepts through open-ended problem solving activities.  
To me, it seems that all of these are important, interesting aspects of mathematics.  Mathematical 
thinking is about reasoning, inferring information from examples, understanding the patterns in 
rules and procedures, and discovering new ideas while working on a difficult problem.  This 
project has helped me to reflect on these different aspects and how I can help my students to 
experience mathematics as a multi-dimensional discipline. 
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